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DOES THE CONSTITUTION DESERVE OUR
FIDELITY?: COLLOQUY
PROFESSOR BALKIN: Why don't I start with Bill's [William
Treanor] comments, which are fresh in our minds.
Here is where I disagree with what Bill said. One could argue that
the reason why we should have faith in the Constitution is because the
alternative would be so much worse. But you could make the same
argument in a lot of different situations. It is basically Hobbes's argu-
ment for the state. And let me tell you, Hobbes would have put up
with an awful lot of bad things from the state. So it doesn't really
strike me as a convincing argument for fidelity.
You might make another argument: The Constitution is really bad
now, but it is going to get better. But that suggests that what we really
believe in is that things will get better. (Saying that the Constitution
could be worse is not a statement of faith.) In fact, that won't do:
What we really have to believe is that the Constitution is morally ac-
ceptable now and that it will get even better in the future. If we don't
believe it is acceptable now, then we are conceding that it is unaccept-
able. We don't even get to the next step. That is why I find Bill's
strategy of dealing with the problem of constitutional evil
unpersuasive.
Bill also talks about Lincoln. I agree that Lincoln is a wonderful
example. Bill is right that Lincoln presents both sides of the problem
of constitutional evil, and he's right that Lincoln engages in a trans-
formative moment of constitutional rhetoric. By the way, I also really
liked Garry Wills's book Lincoln at Gettysburg.
But my only point is that you and I, Bill, are not the President of the
United States. In Constitutional Faith,' Sandy Levinson asks whether
he should sign the Constitution of the United States. He compares
this decision to Justice Story's act of constitutional faith in upholding
the Fugitive Slave Act in Prigg v. Pennsylvania2 in order to save the
Union: You are Justice Story, and Prigg v. Pennsylvania is in front of
you. How do you resolve the case? And of course, Story says, "Look
I've got to preserve the Union. I have to do this."
But it's important to recognize that when you are an ordinary citi-
zen, you are not on the Supreme Court, you are not the President of
the United States. You are part of a much larger enterprise, in which
your wishes as to what the Constitution will mean are like a little drop
in a big ocean. There are very few individuals who have concentrated
within them the power to change the meaning of the Constitution on
their own. It happens, but there are not a lot of such people. Lincoln
1. Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Faith (1988).
2. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842).
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was one of them. That is why the problem of constitutional faith is
different for Lincoln and Story than it is for us.
We law professors like to think we are really Supreme Court Jus-
tices. We write in normative prescriptions: "The Constitution means
this; the courts should do that." Sometimes we write as if we can just
draft the article and it will be enforced because it is right. Here is a
good reason, so do it. It's like Captain Picard saying, "Engage!" As if
giving a good argument would make it so. But of course, this is a
fantasy. That's not what is going on.
Because we can't control what the Constitution is or is going to be-
come, the problem of constitutional fidelity for us has to be different
than the problem of constitutional fidelity for someone who has that
power concentrated within them at a certain point in history.
You don't even have to hold office to be such a figure. Martin Lu-
ther King was not elected to anything as far as I know and I think he
changed the meaning of the Constitution. He converted what was off
the wall into what was on the table. I want to support Bill's point that
sometimes that happens.
But the problem of faith for such people will be different than the
problem for you, unless, of course, you become that type of person
and more power to you! I hope that in this audience there will be
several (if there are not already). But I am not betting on it, you
know, for myself. I am a poor lowly law professor. Although I have
written papers on lots of constitutional issues and taken lots of norma-
tive stands, I would be amazed if anyone put them into practice. I'm
at the Yale Law School where you would think I would have some
influence, but it is not that kind of influence. So we must deal with the
problem of constitutional faith for ourselves differently than Lincoln
would.
Kitty [Catharine MacKinnon], if you remember, we had a wonder-
ful conversation the last time you were in New Haven, and you began
to offer the theory you offered here, and I want to expound it further.
You won't describe it in the same way I do because I know you don't
like to use the word "morality." Morality is a term loaded with all
sorts of political and historical associations that you want to avoid pre-
cisely because of their history. So here you have offered a new sort of
theory-I think it has always been a part of your work-but I will call
it a new theory. Instead of a natural law theory-law is what is truly
moral or just-it is Law as Reality. Law is that which appropriately
deals with or reflects what is socially real, what is really happening in
society. Law is not simply what should be legal. Law already is what
is real, and that's what positive law has to become. The law of the
courts may not accurately reflect social reality now, but the law will
become, will match what is actually going on out there.
There are lots of ways of putting this in terms of the categories that
I offered in my paper, but one that strikes me as useful to think about
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is this: You are making a claim on the Constitution. It is not a ques-
tion of whether or not you have fidelity in the Constitution. You are
saying, "Listen, this is what you folks have to do, because this is what
the law is. The question of fidelity does not arise for me, because for
me the law is what is real. You judges haven't figured it out yet, but
that's what it is, don't you see?" That's why the issue of 'fidelity
doesn't arise for you: if the Constitution reflects reality, what's the
problem, right?
But on the other hand, you are doing something else as well, which
also brackets the question of fidelity, and it's related to Dorothy's pa-
per. You are saying: "I don't want to talk about fidelity. I want to
talk about collecting on debts. I want to talk about getting what was
owed us. I am not talking about being faithful to you. I want you to
be faithful to me. And it is time for you to do it, put up or shut up."
This is not a rejection of fidelity; it is a demand for fidelity. It is as if
you were in a marriage, for twenty years, say, with someone who is
sleeping around and one day you say to them: "Look, faithful is faith-
ful. I demand fidelity because you are in this relationship with me and
you have an obligation."
Let me talk about Dorothy's paper. I really liked Dorothy's paper
and I learned a lot from it. I'm very interested in the study of ideol-
ogy and the sociology of knowledge. And I'm interested in how peo-
ple can be self-critical about their political commitments and their
views about social reality. Some people are more pessimistic about
this than I am, but I believe that such critical self-consciousness is pos-
sible. It is not only possible but necessary, necessary to do not only
constitutional law, but jurisprudence as well.
But I have discovered over the years that although critical self-con-
sciousness is possible, you can't do it by yourself. You need help.
Often help comes from your friends, and often help comes from peo-
ple whom you didn't expect. But you need help, you can't do it by
yourself.
I took Dorothy's paper home last night, read it and had two
thoughts. My first thought was: Wow, there is real psychological in-
sight here. Why didn't I think of that? My second thought was, I
understood why. She and I see things from different positions. That's
the point. Sometimes you can't do it by yourself. You need help. So
that's what I wanted to say about Dorothy's paper, from which I
learned an enormous amount.
Sot Barber and I agree on the aspirational vision of the Constitu-
tion. But I want to emphasize one point of our agreement that is es-
pecially important. To be an aspirationalist is not to engage in what I
call "happy talk" about the Constitution. It is not to engage in the
belief that things are just great and the Constitution is getting better.
"In every day and every way, I'm becoming a better Constitution."
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That is not what aspirationalism is about. I want to second Sot's
views on this and emphasize them. To be an aspirationalist is to un-
derstand the darkness and the evil and the wickedness in the begin-
nings of our existence as a nation.
To be an aspirationalist is to hope for redemption. But to be re-
deemed you must first recognize sin. You have to understand that
your personality and what you have become arise out of that sin, you
must come to terms with that. That is why an aspirationalist should
be, I think, more sober about the problem of constitutional evil than
anybody else.
People who aren't serious about constitutional evil engage in happy
talk. As I say in the paper, they are like people who think they are
helping an alcoholic or a drug addict by pretending there is nothing
wrong. These people are doing that person no good. A person in that
condition needs to understand who they are and what they have be-
come. That's the only way others can help them out.
Now let me talk about. Michael's paper. One of the things I have
been working on over a number of years is the concept of "ideological
drift." Ideological drift is the phenomenon where an idea gets re-
peated over and over again through history and as it gets repeated, it
starts to take on a different shape and a different meaning and a dif-
ferent political valence. Take colorblindness in 1896. It's politically
radical. But by 1996 it's the rallying cry of racial conservatives.
Michael says the problem with talking about constitutional evil is
that the Constitution is indeterminate. It doesn't have to be evil be-
cause it can mean lots of different things.
I was looking at Mark Thshnet in the audience. In 1979 he wrote a
paper called Truth, Justice, and the American Way in the Texas Law
Review, making an argument for the indeterminacy of the Constitu-
tion.3 It's a key paper in the history of critical legal studies.
Then I look at Michael and I think: this is what happened to critical
legal studies! This is ideological drift. I'm sure you didn't want this to
happen, but the Zeitgeist has drifted over and fallen on top of you.
In fact it's not clear how much Michael and I disagree. Another
argument I've made repeatedly is that what really shapes the path of
the law is ideology, or the dominant cultural sense, the ways of under-
standing, the tools of understanding, the cultural software of the time.
That is what makes the law move. My slogan for this is: Ideology is
Constraint. At any point the law seems quite determinate, even
though it can change. What makes it determinate is people's ways of
thinking.
Now these ways of thinking change over time, but at any particular
moment they have a certain fixity to them. That's one of the reasons
3. See Mark Tushnet, Truth, Justice, and the American Way: An Interpretation of
Public Law Scholarship in the Seventies, 57 Tex. L. Rev. 1307 (1979).
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why law feels determinate. But a change in ideology will produce a
change in that sense of determinacy.
Michael says to me: "You know Balkin, the problem is that the
Constitution is indeterminate and what keeps things basically settled
is the social and political consensus. People respond to the social and
political consensus."
And I am thinking, "this guy makes a lot of sense!" You offered an
example about the changes between the middle-sixties and now, be-
tween the War on Poverty and now. You said that there were many
cases and lots of academic literature about constitutional protection of
the poor, it was not off the wall then.
Frank Michelman wrote a famous article on this point4 His article
is not utopian at all. It is a very well-written law review article with
suggestions about how to modify doctrine; it was squarely in the mid-
dle of a sort of liberal to progressive view of what was politically and
legally possible in 1969.
Perhaps where you and I disagree is that I think that this article is
now off the wall in terms of the governing political consensus, or the
distribution of existing political views. It is not going to become a part
of constitutional doctrine anytime soon. That is because-back to the
point on which you and I agree-the "engine" that gives determinacy
to constitutional doctrine has moved on in a very different direction.
So now the distribution of views looks very different than it did when
Frank's article was written.
Everyone-you and I and Ronald Dworkin and Michael McCon-
nell and everybody else-is in the middle of this world. We get car-
ried along with it. We are not separate from it, we cannot stand back
from it. As the views about what is politically and legally possible
begin to change, so too do our ideas about what positions make you a
wacko or a perfectly serious scholar, or a perfectly centrist kind of
guy. The possibilities for utopian constitutional thought start to
change as well. In other words, as the center changes, so too do the
ends of the political and legal spectrum.
We have been implicitly talking about left reformist or utopian
thought, but one of the things I think is most interesting today in the
United States, is that the shift of the political consensus (or the center
of the distribution of views) from 1969 to the present, has opened up
lots of new possibilities for right wing utopian constitutional thought.
Take Justice Thomas for example. Look at some of the opinions
he's been writing recently. In fact what he's doing is not even utopian
constitutional thought, because he represents one-ninth of the votes
necessary to change the meaning of the Constitution. But beyond Jus-
tice Thomas, there are now lots of people on the right who are willing
4. Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term-Forward: On Protecting
the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 Harv. L Rev. 7 (1969).
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to say things now, think things now, and imagine things now that peo-
ple could not have said, thought, or even imagined a while back.
You can think of this as liberatory from one perspective and as not
liberatory from another. I don't care what your personal interpreta-
tion of it is. I just want to point out that this is happening right in
front of our eyes. These events are evidence of the psychological and
sociological constraints we work with when we try to figure out what
the Constitution means.
PROFESSOR TREANOR: Any comments from the panel? No.
Any questions or comments from the audience?
QUESTION FROM PROFESSOR MARY ANNE CASE: [Noting
that the Fordham banner has the letters "IHS."] In hoc signum-that
means "In this sign you will conquer." The story that is told is the
story about Constantine, and how the Roman Empire came to have
faith in the cross. It was because the promise of victory was fulfilled.
Constantine had a vision that said, in this sign you will conquer, and
he said, if I do, then I will make Christianity the official state religion.
He did, and it so became the official state religion. It was fortuitous
that equality was already in the Constitution, so she could give it her
faith, because it already promised the victory that she sought, and the
people you were discussing also had that kind of faith.
I note that everybody who believes in predestination also tends to
believe that they are among the saved. Is there any case for a consti-
tutional faith even if victory is not promised you under that
constitution?
PROFESSOR ROBERTS: I think your question leads to Derrick
Bell's position that I mentioned in my talk, which is that not only can
we not be assured that victory is imminent, we can be assured it is not
going to happen at all. And, therefore, what do we do about our faith
in the Constitution?
If I read his writings correctly, it's that we should try some other
strategy. He gives the example of a poor Black woman who says she
lives to harass white people, and that's it. But I'm really not sure
there is a way out other than having faith that victory will occur.
Otherwise, the alternative, I think, for many people, of living to harass
white people, is just unacceptable. Another alternative is to reject the
Constitution altogether and establish a separate nation, for example,
which a very small minority believe in. This seems unfeasible as well.
And so you really are, I think, left with this faith that victory will be
ours. I am not sure of, and I don't even think I have read any other
alternative to that. Maybe other people have another way of looking
at it, but I don't think there is much alternative to that.
PROFESSOR MACKINNON: I do think I have another way of
looking at it. I don't know that I can describe what life without hope
looks like. I think that it is hope that makes it possible for people to
get up in the morning, to get through the day. Something else is going
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on in this. It has to do with how you relate to resistance, and what you
get back from fighting against that boot in your neck. And it isn't-
only and ultimately even-about dreaming about the day that it won't
be there. I see the alternative to fighting the boot on your neck-the
ruling alternative as lying there while it is on you while saying that you
are standing up vertical. That is the ruling alternative: compliance
with denial.
What you get out of actual resistance is essentially the over-my-
dead-body stance toward something that is actually keeping you
down. I think there is dignity in that. The other thing that comes out,
that I know I experience, is the answer to the question: Who are you
with? In other words: I won't let them do this to her. It isn't just me.
It is me and her. That is: I stand with her, or them, in this. We are not
going to know whether we will win or not, see. So, in a sense, it
doesn't matter. We really are not going to see this fail or succeed. I
say, face that. It is an historical process and really the only question to
answer is: Where do you stand in it and with whom?
QUESTION FROM PROFESSOR ACKERMAN: I think that,
looking at the big picture here, the Constitution has revolved around
two issues over two centuries. One has been identity. I would say
that the original American Revolution and the founding created an
identity, and the Civil War and Reconstruction centered on identity,
and the period beginning, I suppose with Carolene Products,5 and
moving through the war against Hitler, and Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion6 also centered around a identity. Who we are as Americans is the
central issue of these historical periods.
But there is another great question of constitutional law, revolving
around the distribution of wealth. This was the central issue of the
Constitution from 1815 to 1860; and from 1876 through 1940. Will this
second question reemerge in the future? Consider, for example, a
harbinger of a new constitutionalism-the Balanced Budget Amend-
ment. Not much identity politics in that one! And yet its enactment
could raise many unasked questions: How, if at all, would the Equal
Protection Clause constrain the required budget-balancing?
If the Constitution in the year 2000 has to do with the economy, and
not with identity, our resources for talking about it are very impover-
ished. For example, what is Romer v. Evans's7 implications for the
question of wealth and its distribution? The answer, quite simply, is
that it has no implications. In short, the very nature of main line con-
stitutionalism might be in danger. How to speak about justice in the
distribution of wealth after sixty years of identity constitutionalism?
All legal scholars can point to are a few articles by Frank Michelman
5. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
6. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
7. 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
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and Charles Black. But there is not a truly vibrant discussion of these
matters-even among critical race theorists.
PROFESSOR TREANOR: Any reactions?
PROFESSOR BALKIN: Separate two issues. One is the issue of
whether or not the focus of the federal courts' docket is on the econ-
omy. The second is whether-quite apart from that-serious issues of
identity, status competition between groups, the continuing struggle of
women and minorities to gain social equality, the various com-
promises that will have to be made among all the new immigrant
groups in the United States, will be bubbling up, will become domi-
nant social and political problems. I think they will be.
I think that this is the history of the early twenty-first century:
Huge new waves of immigration in the United States, fighting for re-
spect, along with a continuing fight for social equality that includes
groups already here.
It's possible that the docket of the federal courts won't reflect that.
Perhaps it will be focused on issues of economics: who owns the In-
ternet and the like. But the structure of that docket will not prevent
these other things from happening. They will bubble up to the surface
and demand our attention eventually. They will have their way, they
will demand a voice, because they are such powerful forces. These
issues-of group conflict and competition, and struggle for social
equality-will be realized in some way in the development of constitu-
tional law.
The hope is that the courts will find a new language that will be
helpful, that will help us deal with it. The fear is that courts fascinated
with the antitrust implications of the Internet will not listen to or be
able to understand the people who are literally crying out to them
because of the new kinds of problems that face us at the beginning of
the next century.
I don't know what will happen ultimately, but I do think we have to
distinguish the question of what the federal judiciary thinks is real,
and what is real: what effects will arise from the kinds of social com-
petition and social problems that will exist, whether the federal courts
understand this or not.
PROFESSOR TREANOR: Sandy.
PROFESSOR LEVINSON: I almost feel guilty raising this with
Bill given the eloquence of his comments about Lincoln. The Emanci-
pation Proclamation is useful in two directions. One direction was
yesterday's: Lincoln the emancipator. Ronald Dworkin agreed at
least in theory that Hercules might have to come to the conclusion
that the Emancipation Proclamation was unconstitutional in taking
slaves from loyal North Carolinians and Tennesseans and the like.
But there the image is Lincoln the doer of justice and this constitu-
tion-Herculean constitution-maybe saying, no, you can't do that.
But the Emancipation Proclamation also very notably freed no slaves
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in New Orleans Park Parish, because that was controlled by Federal
troops.
Now, why did Lincoln do that? There are two explanations. One is
that he was a serious constitutionalist, he did this under the war
power, and we were no longer at war in New Orleans; we had already
won. Therefore, he could not liberate a slave in New Orleans. And
remember the Federal Fugitive Slave Act was enforced until 1864,
well after the Emancipation Proclamation. So he was without consti-
tutional authority to liberate a slave, even in New Orleans, let alone
Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky, or Missouri, the slave states in the
Union.
Explanation two: He had that power, but, like Bill Clinton-and
David H. Donald in his biography of Lincoln 8 was so bold as to sug-
gest indirectly that we do have Lincolns among us, one of them is Bill
Clinton (not a happy notion for a variety of reasons)-but the other
reason he might not have freed a slave in New Orleans is because it
would have been politically costly, and there was an election coming
up. In fact, Lincoln thought he was going to lose that election, and
although there are some quotes of, I will do anything, I will risk losing
because morality triumphs, we also know that Lincoln was a very ca-
gey politician who was willing to say all sorts of things-read the Lin-
coln-Douglas debates-in order to win elections.
So, the question for you is, given Lincoln's refusal to free a slave in
New Orleans or the Union States, do you admire him? Is that part of
what makes Lincoln a figure of reverence, and you gave a reverential
speech. We have Dworkin willing to admit, at least in theory, that
maybe Lincoln should be condemned for freeing any slaves. I want
you to talk about whether he should be praised for not freeing all the
slaves.
PROFESSOR TREANOR: I think that is a good question. You
are right about my attitude towards Lincoln. I do revere him. With
respect to New Orleans, the first explanation that you offer is the one
that explains his failure to free the slaves. He was a serious constitu-
tionalist. During the Civil War, Lincoln struggles with the question of
how can he free the slaves. He does very firmly believe that the Con-
stitution doesn't give him the blanket power to free the slaves. There
is a line that Patrick Henry takes in the Virginia ratifying debates that
the President would be able to free the slaves under the war powers.
And that is ultimately what Lincoln decides to do. But he also under-
stood his powers under the War Powers Clause as limited, and New
Orleans reflects his understanding of those limits.
The larger point that I want to make is that the Constitution is not
just a legal document, it is also a document of political transformation,
and Lincoln is very aware of that and uses that, uses symbols. Of all
8. David H. Donald, Lincoln (1995).
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the amendments, there is only one amendment that has been signed
by the President, and that's the Thirteenth Amendment. And so Lin-
coln in signing that was doing something that no President has done at
any point, which is to validate this, to say this amendment is some-
thing I believe in.
The notion of transformation is also present in the Emancipation
Proclamation. Acting within the constitutional order, he was also
transforming it because of what he thought was right. Now, would he
have gone farther? Could he have gone farther? He was criticized for
having gone too far, and he was criticized for not having gone farther.
I nonetheless think he deserves to be praised for what he did and for
his constitutional integrity.
QUESTION FROM THE AUDIENCE: The soul of this two-day
conference has been about a lot of power of ideas, but there has been
a reluctance for folks to maybe take us seventy-five years down the
road. Are we going to see this country constituted in a way where we
can genuinely celebrate a tri-centennial which begins in about three-
quarters of a century, looking to the Declaration period? Not so
much in terms of the world as you want to see it, but your most realis-
tic assessment. Where are we going to be at in our tri-centennial era?
PROFESSOR TREANOR: Responses?
PROFESSOR BALKIN: I don't know.
PROFESSOR KLARMAN: I don't mind taking a shot at that. It
starts out the same way Jack did, which is the Supreme Court's inter-
pretations of the Constitution will depend on where we are socially
and it is hard to know what the issues will be like. I would think that
gay rights would be an issue, if you judge from the opinion polls and
you look at the obvious age biases, you look at what people over sixty
think about gay rights and what people between eighteen and twenty-
four think about gay rights. That issue is going to be resolved and
people will look back at Bowers v. Hardwick' and think that is the
equivalent of Plessy v. Ferguson.1"
You have to just use your imagination about what you think the
divisive social issues will be at the time and that is where the Supreme
Court will be, and whether they get them right or not will depend on
your perspective even advancing further down the road. This is one of
my discomforts with the idea-which I think suffuses the Sympo-
sium-that judicial review and constitutionalism represent a politi-
cally liberal agenda. We are all operating in the shadow of the Warren
Court. There is absolutely no reason in the world to think that consti-
tutionalism or judicial review has a liberal bias. It happened in the
last forty years. For the first 150 years, most of the time the Court
stood up for the bad guys. The Court prevented wealth distribution.
9. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
10. 163 U.S. 537 (1896)
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The Court struck down civil rights legislation. I would think in today's
world with conservative Presidents and conservative Justices, the lib-
erals actually do better than they ought to expect to do. But think
about the nasty things that the conservative Court does. They strike
down campaign finance laws. They strike down economic regulation
under the Takings Clause. They strike down minority voting districts.
They strike down affirmative action.
You need to know what the issues look like, but then the prediction
as to whether the Court will be on the side of justice-what you per-
ceive to be justice-or the other side, that just depends on what the
composition of the Court looks like. They do regressive things as well
as progressive things. They try to predict the future. Sometimes they
get it right, like in Brown v. Board of Education. Sometimes they get
it wrong, like in Furman v. Georgia," where they thought they were
going to strike down the death penalty, and everybody would jump
along on the bandwagon, and they got that as wrong as they possibly
could.
The Court is always more or less where the public is. They are con-
fronting social issues where there is a division of opinion. They are
more or less in the ballpark, but whether they will come down on your
side or the other side seems to me to be a bit of a coin toss with one
exception, which is they represent culturally elite values. That's what
makes the thing anti-democratic. They represent culturally elite val-
ues because they're better educated and they have higher incomes
than the average person in the community. To me, that is an argu-
ment for leaving things up to the political branches. But since I be-
long to the same culturally elite segment of the community, I suppose
that's a statement against interest.
PROFESSOR TREANOR: Any other comments?
PROFESSOR MACKINNON: I would like to say something small
rather than something big about that. It really is just about sexual
assault. The mathematics of it are staggering. One of two things are
happening is that it is in the process of escalating dramatically, partic-
ularly sexual abuse of children, and the numbers themselves begin at a
staggeringly high percentage of both boys and girls who are sexually
abused as children. Not all men who were sexually abused as boys go
on to sexually abuse anybody. But almost all these people-most of
whom but not all of whom are men-who sexually abuse other peo-
ple, were sexually abused as children. And each of them abuses many
people, usually.
If you start out with an already high number, and some unknown
percentage of the people who are sexually abused-especially men-
go on to sexually abuse not one person, but a couple of hundred chil-
dren in their lifetime-that's actually not even a very large number for
11. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
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at least some of these perpetrators-you just have an immense explo-
sion. Exactly what the consequences of that is, I think, something that
would give an important answer to the question you asked-an an-
swer a lot of people do not seem to be ready to think about.
PROFESSOR TREANOR: I think that's all the time we have. I
want to thank this panel for just a terrific discussion. I want to thank
all of the panelists who have been here, and I want to thank you all
very much for coming; you have really made it a very special occasion.
